Abstract. We will outline the contributions of A. V. Kuznetsov to modal logic. In his research he focused mainly on semantic, i.e. algebraic, issues and lattices of extensions of particular modal logics, though his proof of the Full Conservativeness Theorem for the proof-intuitionistic logic KM (Theorem 17 below) is a gem of proof-theoretic art.
Introduction
Alexander Vladimirovich Kuznetsov contributed to several areas of mathematical logic, including the theory of recursive functions, general problems of decidability for propositional logics, problems of expressiveness for propositional and predicate many-valued logics, algebraic analysis of superintuitionistic logics, structural analysis of the lattice of those logics, and investigation of particular modal systems, as well as comparative investigation of lattices of extensions of such systems. I will only discuss here Kuznetsov's contribution to the two last areas, with which I am most familiar and where Kuznetsov and I closely collaborated. On a personal note, I want to say that throughout this collaboration I learned not merely mathematical logic, since I never took a university course in the subject, but also Kuznetsov's manner of thinking in solving logic problems so that I had emulated his way of handling problems long in my work until I developed my own style.
I was introduced to Kuznetsov in about 1969, but our collaboration began only in 1973, when I returned to Chişinău, Moldova, after military service. Prof. V. Ja. Gerčiu was granted a doctoral degree just a year before, in 1972. 1 Thus it was a time, I believe, when Kuznetsov felt that he needed to make some changes in his research to explore other themes in logic, so to speak.
Whichever course his thought was taking at that time, Kuznetsov always focused on a triangle: Computability-Algebra-Logic. He saw the interactions of these three fields, explained in [Kuz 87 ], though the idea could be traced back to [Kuz 79a ], as follows.
In [Kuz 79a ] Kuznetsov writes that for detecting incompleteness or inconsistency of a calculus, it suffices to find a formula that is not derivable from the axioms of the calculus. An analogous task is needed to show that two calculi are not equal in extension; then it suffices to find a formula derivable in one calculus and refutable in the other. Thus, it would be advantageous to find means for detecting refutable formulas. For most known calculi, such means are known as logical matrices, that is, universal algebras with a predicate for designated elements (cf. [Men 97, Cze 80]). Then the complexity of derivability in a calculus can be investigated through the complexity of the matrices, by which the formulas non-derivable in the calculus could be refuted. In general, Kuznetsov calls a separating means an object that stands to the logic in question in some relation R but a refutable formula does not.
One vertex, Logic, in the triangle above was a priority for Kuznetsov. Focusing on a logic system, he concentrated mostly on semantic, namely algebraic, issues and, when it was possible, gave computable estimates of separating means. Although he considered topological or relational models as well (see e.g. [Kuz 79b ]), algebraic models were a universal tool because many logics can be associated with varieties, or equational classes, [MMT 87] of similar algebras.
The present paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I give an expository framework of what Kuznetsov had known about modal logic before he started his research, as well as the results he learned from other researchers in the field, which influenced him. Section 3 contains his own and joint contributions to the subject. I also include there additional references to the results that acted as direct creative impulses for him. Finally, in Section 4 I point out some further and recent developments that have been based on or inspired by those discussed in Section 3 and obtained after the untimely death of A. V. Kuznetsov.
Kuznetsov's knowledge obtained from outside
There was an area, comprised of Kuznetsov's research interests, which included only logical-algebraic context. In this relation, his attention was directed to the propositional intuitionistic logic, Int, and its extensions. Originated in the papers of Gödel and the (assertoric) connectives: ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), → (implication) and ¬ (negation); the other, a modal language, is the expansion of the former by adding modality 2 understood as a unary connective. The notion of a formula for both languages is defined in a usual manner. We will be using A, B, . . . throughout as metavariables for assertoric formulas and α, β, . . . as those for modal formulas. The Greek letters Σ and Γ will be used as metavariables for sets of such formulas, respectively.
We also introduce a special operation of embedding of the assertoric language into the modal language, which for any formula A returns the modal formula A t by placing modality 2 in front of every subformula of A. Accordingly, we define Σ t = {A t | A ∈ Σ}.
Theorem 1 (On embedding). For any formula A, the following equivalence holds:
This theorem has been significantly generalized since the first proof of it had appeared in print in [MT 48 ]. Although Kuznetsov did not contribute to this matter, he was an active participant in discussions, which occurred sporadically at a number of All-Soviet conferences on logic and algebra in the 1970s. These discussions led, on the one hand, to the generalization of the Theorem on Embedding (see Theorem 2 below) and, on the other hand, drew Kuznetsov's attention to provability interpretation of Int and, then, to the definition of Proof-Intuitionistic Logic, KM, and finally to his Full Conservativeness Theorem (see Theorem 17 below).
The Theorem on Embedding demonstrated that Int can be embedded into a classical modal context with respect to S4. Almost two decades later, Grzegorczyk showed in [Grz 67] that S4 in the equivalence above can be replaced with its proper extension, Grz, which is usually defined as S4 augmented with the axiom:
In view of Grzegorczyk's result, it was very natural to ask about other logics among the normal extensions of S4: Which of them stand in the same relation to Int as S4 and Grz? A partial answer to the question gave the following: 6 We regard Ext S4 as comprising only consistent normal extensions of S4. Just as Ext Int has the greatest element, which is Cl, the lattice Ext S4 has the greatest element S4 + p → 2p. In general, for any set of classical tautologies Σ, we denote by Int + Σ the intermediate logic obtained by adding Σ to Int as additional axioms. In the same manner we define an extension S4 + Γ for any set of modal formulas Γ valid in S4 + p → 2p.
For any logic L ∈ Ext Int, we define
Also, we define for any logic
Thus Theorem 1 can be written by the equation ρ(S4) = Int. Now we define
where ⊕ is the join operation in Ext S4, as well as in other lattices of logics being considered here. did interpret modality in S4 as "provability", denoting this modality by a D letter, 9 but Novikov's provability was based on approximations of weights. Thus in 1974, Kuznetsov hoped to find a provability interpretation for Int in terms Novikov's approach, by making it more mathematically precise, and via the Theorem on Embedding.
In
Because of Theorem 4(a), below, we abandoned D 0 for the sake of D. Also, we started considering the calculus D − obtained from D by removing the Weakening from the list of postulated rules of inference. The justification for these moves was as follows.
Two calculi, C 1 and C 2 , (of the same language) are deductively equivalent if
Assuming that both C 1 and C 2 contain Cl, if C 1 and C 2 are deductively equivalent then they are equal in extension, that is, the calculi C 1 and C 2 determine the same set of theorems. with respect to arithmetical interpretation was proven. Shortly thereafter, this logic received a new name, GL, after Gödel and Löb. The abstract [KM 76] also appeared in 1976, but, despite its title, The Logic of Provability, it did not deal with any precise interpretation of modality and the term "provability" was used rather as an inclination to use logic D somehow to interpret Int through the former.
In the spring of 1974, following a suggestion from my friend Nikolai Shakenko, Kuznetsov and I defined the split operation s as follows:
Remark 2. In our discussions with Kuznetsov, this definition preceded the following Working Hypothesis: There is a formula of one variable, say γ(p), of the modal language, which expresses the actual provability in PA by means of calculus D. Then, we found it natural to expect γ(p) to satisfy the following conditions: For any logic L ∈ Ext Int, we call L a t-fragment of some
Theorem 5 ([KM 80]). Let γ(p) be a formula of one variable p, satisfying the conditions
Thus, according to Theorem 2, any logic Int + Σ is a t-fragment of any logic M + Σ t , where S4 ⊆ M ⊆ Grz. Then, by virtue of Theorem 7, Grz is an s-fragment of GL, as well as of D. Hence, (Corollary 7.1) Int is an st-fragment of GL, as well as of D. Finally, Theorem 6 implies that if L ∈ Ext Int is a t-fragment of some extension of D, then L ⊆ LC. However, as the reader will see in Section 3.3, any logic L ∈ Ext Int is a t-fragment of some extension of GL.
Theorem 8 ([KM 80]). The modal logic of the frame (N, >), where N is the set of natural numbers, is the greatest consistent extension of D.
Moreover, the st-fragment of this extension equals LC.
Magari algebras and KM-algebras
A universal algebra (B, ∧, ∨, ¬, 1, 2) is called a Magari 13 (or diagonalizable) algebra if (B, ∧, ∨, ¬, 1) is a Boolean algebra with the unit 1 and the operation 2 is subjected to the following identities:
Both logics GL and D are determined by Magari algebras. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the normal extensions of GL and the varieties of Magari algebras. Now we define
12 This result was also obtained in 1976. Let us be reminded that a universal algebra (B, ∧, ∨, ¬, 1, 2) is called an S4-algebra (or an interior algebra) if it is a Boolean algebra with respect to assertoric operations and the unit 1 and the unary operation 2 satisfies the identities:
An S4-algebra is a Grz-algebra (or Grzegorczyk algebra) if, in addition, it has the following property: Thus, starting from a Magari algebra B, we, according to Theorem 9, get first a Grz-algebra B s and on the next step a Heyting algebra B st .
Theorem 10 ([KM 77]). All the algebras of the form B st , where B is a Magari algebra, generate the variety of Heyting algebras.
Theorem 11 ([KM 77]). Suppose a Grz-algebra (B, ∧, ∨, ¬, 1, 2 s ) was obtained from a Magari algebra (B, ∧, ∨, ¬, 1, 2). Then the operation 2 can be uniquely recovered from the operation 2 s by defining 2x as the greatest element y such that 2 s x ≤ y, and 2 s x ≤ z ≤ y implies 2 s z = z. Also, any finite Grz-algebra B = (B, ∧, ∨, ¬, 1, ⊡) can be converted to a Magari algebra B * = (B, ∧, ∨, ¬, 1, 2) by the definition of 2x as the greatest element y such that ⊡x ≤ y, and ⊡x ≤ z ≤ y implies ⊡z = z, in which case ⊡x = 2 s x.
For the rest of this subsection, we limit ourselves with logics containing GL. We say that a class Θ of similar algebras corresponds to a calculus C if for any formula α, C ⊢ α if and only if α is valid on all the algebras in Θ.
Also, we say that Θ fully corresponds to C if for any formulas α and β, C + α ⊢ β if and only if β is valid on an algebra in Θ whenever α is valid on it (cf. [KM 80], p. 214).
It is clear that if Θ fully corresponds to C then the former corresponds to the latter, since C ⊢ p → p.
Let MC be the variety of algebras, determining C, and let NC be the (abstract) class of the algebras, whose logics are extensions of C, that is, containing the axioms of C and closed under all the postulated rules of inference of C.
Theorem 12 ([KM 80]). The following items hold:
(ii) Class NC fully corresponds to C. 
14 Almost nothing is known about classes fully corresponding to D. The question in [KM 80 ], whether ND is a quasi-variety, was answered negatively in [Mur 83]: Class ND is not universally axiomatizable.
A universal algebra (H, ∧, ∨, →, 1, 2), where (H, ∧, ∨, →, 1) is a Heyting algebra and 2 is subjected to the identities i)-iii) above, is called KMalgebra 15 .
Having 
Lattices of extensions
Logic KM 16 can be defined by adding to Int, now understood in the modal language, the following three axioms:
Kznetsov noticed in [Kuz 78 ] (see also [Kuz 85 ]) that KMcan also be axiomatized by the calculus, where the last formula in the above definition of KMis replaced with
We denote the latter calculus by I ∆ . It is especially convenient when we ask about the Separation Property, which will be discussed in Section 4.
Since [Kuz 85 ]) is in fact equivalent to Theorem 17. A proof of it can be obtained as follows. Let C be a Heyting algebra and A be the class of enrichable algebras in the variety generated by C. Then, by virtue of Corollary 17.1, C ∈ HSP(A). Since every Heyting algebra has the Congruence Extension Property, HSP(A) = SHP(A). Now we notice that "being enrichable" is a ∀∃∀-property, where ∀∃∀-prefix is applied to the conjunction of equalities, that is, to a Horn predicate. Therefore, this property is strictly multiplicatively stable in the sense of [Mal 73, Ch. 7.5]. Also, it is a well-known fact that the first-order properties are preserved by the homomorphism. 17 Let ExtGrz and ExtKM be the lattices of consistent normal extensions of Grz and extensions of KM, respectively. Now we generalize operation s • t, expanding it to the formulas of modal language. We denote this new operation by tr and define it as follows.
Taking a formula α as an argument, we first place 2 s in front of every subformula of α and, then, transform each subformula 2 s β into (β ∧ 2β).
We introduce the following four mappings λ : Ext GL −→ Ext KM, κ : Ext KM −→ Ext GL, µ : Ext GL −→ Ext Grz and χ : Ext KM −→ Ext Int as follows:
It was proved in [Mur 85 ] that λ and κ are isomorphisms and inverses of one another. Also, by using Theorem 3, one can derive that ρ (reduced to Ext Grz) and σ establish inverse isomorphisms between Ext Int and Ext Grz, respectively. 
Moreover, χ and µ are meet semilattice epimorphisms that are not commutative with ⊕. Esakia defined the calculus mHC as follows:
This theorem immediately implies the
where Int should be understood in the modal language. It is clear that KM = mHC + (2p → p) → p. Now let
Then mHC ⊢ α if and only if K4.Grz ⊢ tr(α). 18 Also, Grz ⊢ α if and only if K4.Grz ⊢ α s .
Moreover, K4.Grz is the least normal extension of K4, for which the last equivalence holds (see [Esa 06]). For algebraic developments, one can mention the following continuation of the theme of Theorem 11.
We call a Grz-algebra B enrichable if the Heyting algebra B t is enrichable.
The following statements hold:
(i) An S4-algebra is embedded into an enrichable Grz-algebra if and only if the former is a Grz-algebra;
(ii) The class of enrichable Grz-algebras is an ∀∃-class but not an ∀-class (cf. [Mur 90]).
18 In [Esa 06] Esakia uses an embedding operation #(α), which is different from tr(α) in the clauses of definition for disjunction and conjunction; namely, #(α • β) = #(α) • #(β), where • ∈ {∧, ∨}, whereas tr(α • β) = 2 s (tr(α) • tr(β)). However, one can prove that the formulas #(α) and tr(α) are equivalent in K4.
